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ABSTRACT Taking the French oncology sector as a case study, this paper shows that 
guidelines are used strategically by individual physicians and groups of physicians. 
While some studies have made convincing arguments about the rise of guidelines as a 
manifestation of a new type of objectivity, this case study provides evidence that the 
proliferation of medical guidelines is also the result of an attempt by some physicians to 
improve their positions relative to competing groups. Guidelines could indeed be strategic 
resources used by professional actors at the expense of other professionals in order to (1) 
maintain a sufficient amount of activity and (2) increase control over therapeutic decisions. 
The study also points to other kinds of changes that guidelines may influence, beyond medical 
practices and coordination: the evolution of the structure of power relationships inside the 
medical profession. A perspective on the sociology of organizations, which places concrete 
exchange and bargaining relations at the core of its analysis and treats social control as being 
continually challenged and (re)produced, helps to identify other reasons why standardization 
does not prevent local specificities and may even enhance them. 
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Standards and, more broadly, organizational rules are a key topic in the 
lit­ erature on organizations. Since organizational rules are meant to be 
tools to improve an organization's efficiency, sociologists of organizations 
have long been interested in studying the process of their development, 
as well as their actual impact on individual and collective actions in 
organizations (see, for example, Selznick, 1949; Gouldner, 1954). Indeed, 
analogies can be drawn between some of the questions and results in 
such classic orga­ nizational studies and those of STS studies on medical 
guidelines. 
First, the results of organizational studies contradict the common 
assumption that standards or organizational norms have the power to 
make organizations function uniformly. The studies stress that the 
adaptation of standards to the specificities of each organization is a pre­
requisite for their successful dissemination  (Segrestin, 1997; Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2000). 
 
   
 
This is consistent with well-known results on the inability of guidelines to 
reduce variations in organizational practice, and on the necessity of local 
negotiations and adaptation processes for sustaining everyday care prac- 
tices and institutionalized patterns (Timmermans & Berg, 1997; Zuiderent- 
Jerak, 2007). Second, organizational studies conclude that the introduction 
of standards does not always benefit the actors who are in charge of their 
administration, such as supervisors and regulators (Segrestin, 1996; 
Cochoy et al., 1998; Castel & Merle, 2002). This conclusion is also echoed 
by recent empirical studies that question whether the development of med- 
ical standards contributes to the weakening of the profession's power and 
autonomy (Berg et al., 2000; Timmermans & Kolker, 2004; Weisz, 2005). 1 
Third, organizational studies (Segrestin, 1997; Brunsson & Jacobsson, 
2000) as well as STS studies (Berg, 1997; Bourret, 2005; Cambrosio et al., 
2006) have analysed standards as potentially useful coordinative devices. 
In addition  to these  convergences, the  organizational  approach  and 
some of its key concepts may offer some complementary, original insights 
on standardization and the bureaucratization  of medicine. Drawing from 
seminal works byWeber, sociologists of organizations have shown that col- 
lective  action  is problematic,  notably because  actors pursue  their  own, 
often non-convergent interests, and that power has a dynamic role in rela- 
tions among actors in a context of strategic interdependence  (Emerson, 
1962; Crozier,  1965; Pfeffer  &  Salancik,  1978; Crozier  &  Friedberg, 
1980). This approach leads to an emphasis  on the 'strategic interactions 
among  a  set of  actors  placed  in  a  given  field  of  action  and  mutually 
dependent  for  the  solution  of  some  common  "problem"'  (Crozier  & 
Friedberg,  1995: 75). Taking the French oncology sector as a case, I will 
show that guidelines are used strategically by individual physicians  and 
groups of physicians, and that this helps to explain some characteristics of 
the standardization process. This framework thus has two potential impli- 
cations. First, it reveals another force propelling the development of guide- 
lines.  Berg   (1995),  Daly   (2005)   and  others  have  studied  how  the 
proliferation of guidelines resulted from medical researchers' criticism that 
clinical practices make limited use of available evidence from medical sci- 
ence. These developments have also been treated  as manifestations  of a 
new type  of objectivity in the  medical  domain, 'regulatory  objectivity' 
(Cambrosio et al., 2006). The French oncology sector provides an empir- 
ical case compatible with those theses. However, that sector shows evi- 
dence  that  the  proliferation   of  different,  and  sometimes  conflicting, 
guidelines that were produced at the national, regional and local levels also 
resulted from attempts by some physicians to improve their positions or 
'jurisdiction' (Abbott, 1988) relative to competing groups. Second, in line 
with other studies that clearly demonstrated how competition among pro- 
fessionals accompanied the development of evidence-based medicine (see, 
in  particular,  Marks,  1997),  an  organizational  approach  is  helpful  in 
underlining the dynamics and consequences  of this competition. In par- 
ticular, I will stress how  guidelines may be used  creatively  and oppor- 
tunistically by physicians in order to modify organizational patterns. For 
   
 
instance, the prominence of  cancer centres and their physicians in the 
development and implementation of guidelines re-secured their regional 
and national leadership. 
This point reinforces the argument made by science studies that, par- 
adoxically, standardization does not eliminate the diversity of practices among 
physicians,  even if it may sometimes transform those practices. 
 
 
Material and Methods 
The Characteristics of the French Oncology Sector 
 
There are four main types of healthcare organization involved in cancer care 
in France: French comprehensive cancer centres (Centres de Lutte Contre 
le Cancer, CLCCs), public teaching hospitals, general hospitals and clinics. 
Created in the 1920s, the 20 French comprehensive cancer centres are 
autonomous, publicly funded private institutions that concurrently manage 
research activities and treat patients within their respective regions. Each 
centre is directed by a physician. The 20 directors of the CLCCs collec- 
tively control the board of the National Federation of CLCCs (FNCLCC), 
which acts as an employers' association as well as a facilitator for collabo- 
rative scientific projects. Public teaching hospitals were created in 1958, 
when the Hospital Reform Act linked regional public hospitals to univer- 
sity medical schools (see Jamous & Peloille, 1970). Public teaching hospi- 
tals have become the keystone of the French healthcare system. They are 
expected to offer the best and most advanced treatments, to train physi- 
cians and to conduct medical research for all pathologies. General hospi- 
tals and private clinics participate in cancer care by providing diagnostics 
and/or treatments in surgery, radiotherapy and/or chemotherapy. 
The organization of cancer care in France exhibits some of the major 
characteristics that Pickstone (2007) described and analysed for cancer 
treatment in Great Britain, Sweden and the USA. There also are some dis- 
tinctive features, and this paper will show that the contingent dynamics of 
standardization in France have been influenced by the particularities of the 
country's organization of cancer care. 
First, competition between specialties and between healthcare organi- 
zations is particularly acute in France. There is very little reliable quantita- 
tive information describing the organization of hospital care for cancer 
patients, but public reports and ad hoc research generally conclude that 
cancer centres and teaching hospitals provide less than 40% of total cancer 
care, while community hospitals, either private or public, provide more 
than 60%. Before 2000, no national plan to regulate the organization of 
cancer care had been launched since the revision of CLCCs' status in 1945. 
Cancer centres are obliged to provide the full range of treatments for the 
disease, while other hospitals are free to specialize in a particular activity. 
Many physicians are able to participate in the treatment of cancer, and to 
this day, there are no legal restrictions on the administration of drugs and 
cancer surgery. In constrast to the situation in the USA, for instance, where 
   
 
medical oncologists are the only medical specialists able to prescribe  drugs 
to cancer patients, in France every organ specialist (gastroenterologists, head 
and neck surgeons,  lung  specialists,  internists)  is theoretically  allowed  to 
do so. 
Another major  characteristic of the French cancer sector lies in the 
historical competition between public teaching hospitals and cancer cen- 
tres, which was accurately depicted by Pinell (2002) in his study of anti- 
cancer policy in France at the beginning of the 20th century.  Pinell 
showed that cancer centres were conceived as research- and pathology-ori- 
ented structures, under strong state sponsorship, that promoted a collab- 
orative and comprehensive approach to cancer management. This 
contrasted sharply with public hospitals, which were more oriented to par- 
ticular organ systems and dominated by surgeons, in line with the tradi- 
tion of the Paris Clinical School. This competition for market share and 
the contention over the definition of the legitimate medical approach to 
cancer treatment continued throughout the second half of the 20th century 
(Castel & Friedberg, 2004). 
 
Data 
 
Fieldwork was carried out in six different settings: at the national level, 
within the FNCLCC, which was the main producer of cancer guidelines in 
France during the period under scrutiny (1999-2006), and in five French 
administrative regions. 
Fieldwork at the national level (1999-2002) focused on the genesis of 
the federal guidelines project and main goals assigned to it. Data were 
obtained from daily informa} exchanges and semi-directed interviews with 
the main federal actors in charge of the project and with project directors. 
1 also had access to working documents and the proceedings of meetings, 
where the scope of the project was discussed, decided and (re)defined. 
At the regional level, 1conducted nearly 300 semi-directed interviews with 
representatives of regulatory bodies, directors of hospitals and physicians 
(1999-2002). In a specific region, for 4 years 1 was able (2003-2006) to 
observe collective decision-making processes through which physicians negoti- 
ated and validated guidelines, and to interview physicians about their involve- 
ment in, and their opinions on, guideline implementation. 1also observed the 
therapeutic decision-making processes (N=450) of four medical staff mem- 
bers, focusing on the manner in which physicians referred to guidelines when 
they had to develop therapeutic strategies for actual patients. 
 
A Non-unified Process Led by Professional Organizations 
The development of medical guidelines in the French oncology sector was 
not unified: it followed several professional initiatives set forth primarily by 
the FNCLCC from the beginning of the 1990s that existed alongside the 
initiatives of medical societies and public agencies in competition for the 
legitimacy conferred by the scientific authority in the sector. 
   
 
A Professional Initiative 
 
Early attempts to institutionalize the production and use of guidelines in 
the French healthcare system began at the turn of the 1990s (Robelet, 
2002). In 1987, a national agency was created to develop medical evalua- 
tion, but its actual results had been rather modest. The 1991 Health Law 
underlined once again the importance of evaluation in the healthcare sector 
(including evaluation of medical practices), but this did not lead to any sig- 
nificant change either. In fact, the first national standards were promul- 
gated in 1993.These norms, however, were aimed at forbidding dangerous 
and costly practices rather than promoting the best ones (Kerleau, 1998). 
Furthermore, cancer care was not addressed by these public guidelines. 
The first French recommendation regarding cancer was published in 1993 
by a medical society (the French Society of Mammography and Breast 
Pathology) and dealt with quality criteria in mass-screening for breast cancer - 
a diagnostic procedure. 
From then on, cancer centres took the lead in developing cancer guide- 
lines in France. In 1993, the board of the FNCLCC mandated some of 
their peers to launch a project aimed  at 'harmonizing clinical practices 
between cancer centres, concerning diagnostic, classification,  treatment 
and follow-up procedures' (Annual Report of the Fédération Nationale des 
Centres de Lutte Contre le Cancer, 1994 [author's translation]). The 
selected methodology to elaborate these guidelines was initially a consen- 
sus conference. But a trip to the USA, where the project leaders visited var- 
ious prestigious US medical institutions, changed their minds: guidelines 
should rather be based on a critical review of medical literature in order to 
limit the impact of subjective opinions by the most reputable physicians 
and consequently to 'objectify' these guidelines. This project was thus 
explicitly conceived as a part of the emerging evidence-based medicine. 
From this point onwards, the scope of the project also changed its aim to 
defining the best practices not only for CLCCs, but also for the entire sec- 
tor. It was sponsored by individual CLCCs and by the National League 
Against Cancer, the main patient organization in France. 2 
Methodologists were recruited by the Federation. They were public health 
physicians who were trained to review the literature and to evaluate whether 
or not the final guidelines were congruent with this literature. They were 
meant to argue against physicians when the latter were prone to developing 
guidelines according to their own experience or according to the first results 
of the latest clinical trials rather than to a systematic review of the literature. 
In addition to the methodologists, the project's leaders planned from 
the start to involve as many cancer centre physicians as possible in the devel- 
opment of guidelines. From their point of view, this strategy presented some 
assets: first (and quite obviously), these 1000 or so physicians represented a 
skilled labour force; second, their participation was conceived as a way to 
train them to learn and practice evidence-based medicine and to facilitate 
the acceptance and appropriation of guidelines. By the end of 1994, 300 
cancer centre physicians had already participated, either in the task groups 
   
 
TABLE 1 
Participation of medical societies in the FNCLCC's guidelines (1993-2006) 
 
 
Medical society Number of guidelines 
 
 
French Dermatology Society 2 
French Society of Pediatric Oncology 6 
French Federation of Digestive Oncology 2 
French Society of Gynecologic Oncology 4 
Society for the Study and the Treatment of Pain 5 
French Society of Pneumology 2 
Study Group of Lymphomas 2 
Others* 6 
Total 29 
 
 
*French Sarcoma Group, French-speaking  Society of Entreal Nutrition, French Society of 
Pathology, French Association of Urology, French-speaking Society of Brain Surgery, and 
French Society of Nuclear Medicine. 
 
(which developed the clinical practice guidelines) or in the feedback process 
(consisting of comments on the first versions of the guidelines). Six hundred 
physicians had taken part in the project by 1998.The first documents, called 
'Standards, Options and Recommendations' (SOR), were produced in 
1995. They consisted of long monographs (about 200 pages) and of sum- 
maries published by the main French cancer journal Bulletin du cancer.3 
 
Collaboration and Competition 
 
Beginning with the publication of the first SORs, the FNCLCC involved 
more and more people working outside the CLCCs. At first, in 1995, an 
advisory board was created in addition to the executive committee, which 
was exclusively composed of five directors. In 1996, the executive commit- 
tee welcomed one more CLCC physician, two representatives of medical 
societies (paediatric oncology and gynaecologic oncology) and four physi- 
cians who practiced outside CLCC. The advisory board grew to 74 members. 
It was decided in 1997 to create a scientific board exclusively composed of 
people working outside CLCC. 
From 1998 to 2006, the FNCLCC published 29 clinical practice 
guidelines in collaboration with a medical society and more than half of the 
physicians who participated in the elaboration of guidelines or in the feed- 
back process worked outside CLCC. 
Despite this alliance with other actors or institutions, the FNCLCC man- 
aged the process and kept the label 'Standards, Options and Recommendations' 
and the (legal) responsibility for its guidelines during this period.4 It was respon- 
sible for 81 of 148 French clinical practice guidelines (54%) that were published 
(see Fig. 1). Furthermore, the British Journal of Cancer, one of the most highly 
regarded cancer journals in Europe, also published the SORs. FNCLCC is the 
only French  organization whose cancer guidelines are disseminated outside 
France. The SORs were approved by the state, and medical audits conducted by 
social insurance bodies used them as reference. 
   
 
FIGURE 1 
Producers of French cancer guidelines (1993-2006) 
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Other French producers of guidelines were the medical societies. They 
published 46 sets of guidelines between 1997 and 2007. Like the FNCLCC, 
their guidelines concerned the management of specific cancers. Among 
them, the French Association of Urology (14 published guidelines -9%), the 
French Society of Hematology (nine guidelines) and the French Federation 
of Digestive Oncology (six guidelines) were the most productive . Other med- 
ical societies published only one guideline during this period. 
Guidelines by the National Agency were of a different kind: they cor- 
responded either to recommendations for prevention and screening pro- 
cedures or the evaluation of new techniques, or they answered precise 
questions (for example, 'Can initially non-resectable hepatic metastases 
be made resectable? '). 
 
Diversity of the Implementation Processes at the Regional Level 
 
A recent study funded by the French National Cancer Institute confirmed 
the results of two previous surveys conducted by the FNCLCC :the SORs 
were generally considered by physicians as the most reliable guidelines for 
oncology. However, the physicians who worked in CLCCs or who devoted 
more than one-half of their activity to cancer patients were more familiar 
with these guidelines and utilized them more frequently. 
Nonetheless, the SORs were considered as tools for everyday practice 
by a few practitioners who worked inside teaching hospitals or cancer 
centres. Cancer centres thus created voluntary and cooperative networks 
for the elaboration and implementation of regional treatment protocols 
adapted to the characteristics and resources of the local healthcare system. 
This entailed initiating and monitoring the discussion process at the 
regional level. Federal review monographs were thus transformed into 
decision-making algorithms and into specific recommendations of one or 
another  remedy  chosen  from  among  several  scientifically  appropriate 
  
 
 
treatments. In some regions, the cancer centre created a network without 
involving the regional teaching hospital. As a result, these teaching hospi- 
tals organized opposing networks. 
Besides these regional networks, some physicians who specialized in the 
treatment of specific organs - mainly urologists, gastroenterologists,  sur- 
geons, lung specialists and haematologists - stated that they used the guide- 
lines of medical societies rather than the SORs.Thus, while French physicians 
generally considered the SORs to be the standard reference guidelines and 
appreciated them for their scientific reliability, in practice they referred to dif- 
fering and even contradictory guidelines (Fervers et al., 2006). 
 
Development of Guidelines as a Collective Strategy 
for Intra-professional Legitimacy 
The specific dynamics of this movement - its initial impulse and the diversity 
of involved organizations at the national and regional levels - contributed to 
the specific organization of cancer care in France. In particular, the rivalry 
and competition between specialties (pathology-centred specialists vs. organ- 
centred specialists) and between hospitals influenced this development. 
 
The Reinstatement  of Cancer Centres as Dominant Actors 
through the Development of Guidelines 
 
There were several reasons for the launch of the guidelines programme by the 
FNCLCC. On one hand, the development  of the guidelines was in line with 
a process described in other studies as an intra-professional movement 
favouring a more 'scientific' basis for medical knowledge (Berg, 1995; 
Timmermans & Kolker, 2004; Cambrosio et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
there were instrumental reasons for pursuing  such  a  programme:  the 
CLCCs' directors expected to take advantage of this programme to re-secure 
their role at the national level and at the apices of regional hierarchies. 
The traditional collective identity of French cancer centres and the 
evolution of their position in the French oncology sector explain why their 
physicians first became involved in the development and dissemination of 
guidelines. These guidelines have been considered as tools for reinstating 
themselves as scientific leaders in the sector and as partners for other physi- 
cians. This project was the keystone for an ambitious reform programme 
conducted by the FNCLCC. This programme also consisted of the devel- 
opment of research activities, an accreditation programme and the negoti- 
ation of new professional statutes for employees. lt was a direct response to 
increasing competition for the CLCCs and to critiques by other stakehold- 
ers in the sector (Castel & Friedberg, 2004). In particular, in 1993 a public 
report (Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales, 1993) raised the ques- 
tion of maintaining cancer centres, as they were considered to be costly and 
their added value in the treatment of cancer could not be ascertained. The 
group of physicians who developed this programme shared a number of 
distinctive features. First, their medical specializations contrasted with those 
   
 
of the previous  directors of the centre that they were heading. Three of 
these directors were the first medical oncologists to be appointed as heads of 
their cancer centres, while the fourth was the first radiotherapist. The four 
followed three surgeons and a pathologist as directors. In sum, the four had 
some common, disciplinary interests to defend, as surgery was the still 
dominant treatment technique in cancer care, and so they were more open 
than others to the rise of chemotherapy and its implications for the posi- 
tion taken by the CLCCs. Second, the members of this group of reformers 
had been actively and very successfully involved in research activities, a fact 
that strongly contrasted with other directors of the National Federation's 
board. In particular, the three medical oncologists spent some time in the 
USA, where they had been appointed research fellows at some of the most 
prestigious American institutions at which new treatments had been devel- 
oped through experimental research and multi-centre clinical trials (the 
National Cancer Institute, and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research in 
Seattle, WA). 
In 1993, the instigator of the guidelines project was a paediatric oncol- 
ogist, the director of a cancer centre located in a very competitive region. 
His motives in developing guidelines were fourfold. First, he shared with his 
American peers the goal of implementing state-of-the-art practices in every 
hospital (see Berg, 1995; Daly, 2005), and he could have qualified, using 
Marks' (1997) expression, as a 'therapeutic reformer'. Indeed, he could not 
abide by the heterogeneity of the treatments that were prescribed by physi- 
cians in his centre as this would imply unequal treatment of patients. He was 
all the more sensitive to this issue given that the international community of 
paediatric oncologists had been involved in the question of harmonizing 
their practices for many years (Castel & Dalgalarrondo, 2005). Second, he 
realized that this heterogeneity was an obstacle to the regional legitimacy of 
his centre: physicians from other hospitals might question the quality of the 
advice that CLCC physicians offered them. 
 
There have been two initial reasons to launch this project. The first one is 
an inner one. We, paediatric oncologists, treated lymphoma with a specific 
protocol and we saved 75% of the children. In another service, physicians 
treated adults with lymphoma with another protocol and saved only 25% 
of patients. Thus, the poor patient was 25% likely to survive if he was over 
16, whereas children under 16 were 75% likely to survive. And 1 did not 
judge it justifiable that patients be treated differently from one service to 
another ....The second reason is an anecdote. Dr X [a head of service in a 
big public general hospital] called me once and told me: 'I called your cen- 
tre to ask if it was possible to prescribe birth contrai pills to a woman with 
breast cancer and 1had three different answers.'Then, he told me: 'As long 
as you are not able to agree with each other - or at least to argue why you 
disagree - we will not consider you as the leading hospital.' (Interview with 
the director of the cancer centre, 1999; author's translation) 
 
Third, this director hoped that the development of guidelines could be used 
to reshape (and improve) the relationships between his centre and other 
general hospitals. His centre should appear to other hospitals as a facilita- 
   
 
tor for treating the more frequently occurring cancers, as a scientific refer- 
ence centre that could help them treat more complex and rare cancers, and 
a centre that they could use for referring patients to clinical trials or for spe- 
cific care. 
 
Physicians who work in other hospitals want us to let them develop their 
business . ... Our answer is the thesaurus [that is, the treatment protocols], 
outside consultations ... it is an openness which leads us to advise a treat- 
ment for patients we do not necessarily see. It is an evolution you know 
well. (Presentation to the medical board of the cancer centre, 1993; 
author's translation) 
 
Last, in the same presentation he said that guidelines might be mentioned as 
a reason to convince regulatory bodies to pay for new, expensive treatments. 5 
Other directors were soon convinced of the strategic opportunities fur- 
nished by this project for CLCCs. At the national level, they were well 
aware that it might  contribute to re-establishing their legitimacy for the 
public authorities and the French medical community. At a time when con- 
cern for quality in the healthcare system was rising (Setbon, 2000; Robelet, 
2001, 2002), CLCCs would be the hospitals that set the example. 
 
At the rime [in 1993, at the beginning of the project], the Social Security 
agency was about to elaborate guidelines. ...Tuen, what was our usefulness 
if, as oncologists, we were not able to produce cancer guidelines? We thus 
decided together: 'We will produce guidelines by ourselves and respect them 
before we are forced to do so by someone else.' ... Furthermore, our oncol- 
ogists used to say that they were the best. They had to prove it [in produc- 
ing guidelines]! (Interview with a director, 2002; author's translation) 
 
The SORs were preeminently seen by the directors as a way to set the rules 
in the oncology sector. Teaching hospitals were particularly threatening to 
them. From the 1980s onwards, teaching hospitals claimed that cancer cen- 
tres were not useful anymore, since they had the same missions in the field 
of cancer care. The teaching hospitals further argued that their physicians, 
specialized in organ treatments and at the forefront of clinical research, were 
more qualified to treat (and cure) cancer and to teach other physicians how 
to do so. In this struggle for legitimacy, the directors conceived of guidelines 
as a way to reaffirm the usefulness of CLCCs alongside the teaching hospi- 
tals. But the guidelines were also a tool to defend the medical approach and 
the organization of cancer care that CLCCs had developed (Pinell, 2002) 
and were very proud of. CLCC was an organization based on the participa- 
tion of every medical specialist in the decision-making process related to a 
patient's treatment strategy - a multidisciplinary approach. It differed from 
teaching hospitals, which tended to promote another model in which mas- 
tery of the initial decision was given to the organ specialist (and mainly to 
the surgeon). It therefore cornes as no surprise that one of the first guide- 
lines elaborated by the FNCLCC was entitled 'Standards, Options and 
Recommendations Concerning Good Practices in the Multidisciplinary 
Organization of Cancer Care' (Chardot et al., 1995). 
  
 
 
At the regional level, the directors' expectations were congruent with 
those of the project leaders: they intended to use the SORs to restore the 
leadership of their centre and to improve its relationships with general (private 
and public) hospitals. But they also had specific strategic uses of the SORs 
depending on the local organizational context. For instance, for some direc- 
tors who had decided to enhance collaboration with the regional teaching 
hospital, the SORs helped them to initiate a dialogue between their physi- 
cians and those who worked in the teaching hospital. In one region, the 
elaboration of a common language and common therapeutic attitudes sub- 
sequently allowed a new division of cancer care between these two hospi- 
tals to be established. In other regions, the directors hoped that the 
diffusion of guidelines would facilitate the treatment of common cancers by 
general hospitals, allowing CLCC physicians to concentrate on complex 
tasks. In contrast, in some sectors the SORs were a tool to restrict the entry 
of newcomers. 
 
When the organization of cancer care was discussed at the regional level 
[with regulatory bodies and hospital representatives] two years ago, we 
had a clear idea about which hospitals we wanted to work with and with 
which we did not. We came to the discussions with the SORs, saying: 
'These are the best practices in oncology and we cannot sel! off oncology. 
Thus, only hospitals which are able to comply with the SORs may care for 
cancer patients.' If you refer to some rules which you do not have written 
down and which describe what has to be done, it defuses a bomb. Then, 
we succeeded in selling the ideas of a multidisciplinary organization of 
cancer care and a unique regional medical record . ... It is not al! achieved, 
but .... People have made headway. We may notice that some hospitals 
have given up the idea of developing oncology, others have grown bigger. 
(Interview with a vice-director of a CLCC, 2001; author's translation) 
 
Although the SORs were used to achieve various specific results, at their 
core the guidelines represented for CLCC directors a tool to the reorgani- 
zation of cancer care in their regions. This was a major motive for adopting 
the project. 
 
Counter-reactions 
 
As noted earlier, public authorities delegated cancer guidelines to the 
FNCLCC and approved the SORs, thus reinstating CLCCs as legitimate 
organizations in the French oncology sector. Medical societies then stepped 
in and became involved in the development of cancer guidelines. Sorne of 
them collaborated with the FNCLCC and others produced their own 
guidelines. These different attitudes were partially linked with the specific 
relationships that oncologists had developed previously with the different 
organ specialties. 
The medical societies that have been the most prolific producers of guide- 
lines are dominated by organ specialists, who traditionally oversee the care of 
particular cancers at the expense  of oncologists. They consider  oncologists 
to  be  merely  'sub-contractors'.  Indeed,  urologists,  gastroenterologists  and 
   
 
haematologists perceived oncologists as competitors. For instance, urologists 
usually consider surgery to be the best treatment against localized and locally 
advanced prostate cancers, even though some studies have concluded that sur- 
gery and radiotherapy have equivalent risks as treatments. For them, radio- 
therapy must be an option when surgery is not possible. The respective place 
of these two treatments for prostate cancers remains controversial (Hakenberg 
et al., 2006). In the same vein, gastroenterologists consider themselves to be 
more qualified than oncologists to prescribe drugs for gastrointestinal cancers, 
since they understand the workings of the corresponding organs better and 
thus are able to develop treatment protocols accordingly. However, even if 
they more or less openly criticized the FNCLCC for trying to lead the devel- 
opment of guidelines at the national level, all these societies could not help but 
to attest to the importance of the SORs. 
 
It is true that there have been conflicts between oncologists and urologists. 
Things are changing, leading to fewer conflicts. But this remains very much 
'physician-dependent' . .... But there is still a problem: the FNCLCC still 
tends to think that cancer centres embody cancer care.We answer that they 
are only one actor amongst others. ... The methodology that the French 
Association of Urology is using to produce guidelines is becoming more 
and more credible. We are trying to elaborate them according to the level 
of evidence, like the SORs. (Interview with a member of the board of the 
French Association of Urology, 2003; author's translation) 
 
Unlike the first medical societies, the physicians that agreed to participate 
in the SOR project happened to be either oncologists, or organ specialists 
who were used to working with oncologists. Since the 1970s, the French 
Society of Pediatric Oncology had been composed of physicians from cancer 
centres and teaching hospitals who had developed common research and 
treatment protocols (Castel & Dalgalarrondo, 2005). In the French Society 
of Gynecologic Oncology, gynaecologists and oncologists have collaborated 
for a long time, since breast cancer was one of the first cancers that was 
amenable to treatment with a multidisciplinary approach - combining sur- 
gery, radiotherapy and medical treatment (Pickstone, 2007). 
However, even if the organization of cancer care influenced the devel- 
opment and implementation of guidelines, it did not determine them. 
Specialists who once were competitors learned to work together on the 
development of guidelines. For instance, the French Society of Dermatology 
finally agreed to co-sign two guidelines with the FNCLCC, although they 
had been reluctant to  do so for a long time. The French Federation of 
Digestive Oncology also joined the SOR project 3 years ago, after it had 
published six guidelines itself. One hypothesis for this development lies in 
the legitimacy that the SOR project gained in the French oncology sector, 
so that it was difficult for an (isolated) medical society to continue this 
activity in parallel. Another hypothesis is that the regulatory capacity of evi- 
dence-based medicine entailed an inherent reflexivity among participants 
and resulted in the production of conventions and concerted programmes 
of action (Cambrosio et al., 2006). 
  
 
 
Individual Authority and Guidelines 
In the French oncology sector, physicians tend to hold a positive opinion of 
guidelines (Castel & Merle, 2002; Fervers et al., 2006). They consider that 
guidelines limit the risk of patients and hospital managers mistrusting the qual- 
ity of medical practices, and they appreciate the guidelines being developed 
exclusively by professionals (including those approved by public authorities) 
and their not being used by public authorities to sanction physicians (Castel & 
Merle, 2002). One may also hypothesize that this positive opinion is due to 
the specificity of the pathology and the historical organization of its manage- 
ment,6 but to pursue this hypothesis would necessitate a systematic compar- 
ison with the development of guidelines for other pathologies. I will argue in 
this section that participation in the development and implementation of 
guidelines may also be the result of an individual strategy by physicians to 
increase the visibility of their specialization in cancer care and in the medical 
community, and thus to have greater control of patients' 'trajectories', which 
refers 'not only to the physiological unfolding of a patient's disease but to the 
total organization of work clone over that course' (Strauss et al., 1985: 8). In 
brief, intra-professional legitimacy is also at stake for the individual practi- 
tioner, which partly explains why some become involved in the elaboration 
and implementation  of guidelines while others do not. 
 
The Interests of Cancer Centre Physicians in the SOR Project 
 
The SOR project probably would have failed if the physicians who directed 
CLCCs had not convinced 'rank-and-file' oncologists to participate. As 
noted above, nearly two-thirds of the medical community enrolled within a 
few years. The CLCC physicians we interviewed between 1999 and 2002 
did not criticize either the developmental process of the SORs or the quality 
of the final documents. Instead, they generally expressed pride in their par- 
ticipation. For instance, in 1995, seven of the most significant inter-CLCC 
scientific groups (specializing in gynaecological tumours, breast cancers, 
gastrointestinal cancers, genetic oncology, infectious diseases in oncology, 
statistics and radiology) prominently included participation in the SORs in 
their annual reports. 
There are three reasons for this success. The first is an institutional: 
CLCC physicians were aware that the oncology sector was becoming more 
competitive and thus increasingly threatening for them. They believed that 
the SORs could contribute to re-establishing cancer centres as leaders in 
the French oncology sector. 
 
The SORs are a wonderful tool and only CLCCs are able to produce it - 
thanks to our multidisciplinary culture. We receive great credibility when 
we publish a SOR. ... When we write such texts, we become incontestable 
in the sector. (Interview with a radiotherapist, 2000; author's translation) 
 
Moreover, the traditional multidisciplinary organization inside CLCCs 
facilitated the acceptance and support of this project by the participating 
   
 
physicians. They were also more likely to accept a formalized (collective 
and multidisciplinary) regulation of their practices. 
 
The guidelines are part of a global evolution, but this does not represent 
a revolution for us. For other hospitals, it may be a cultural revolution ... : 
the systematic reference to a document for therapeutic decision-making 
and the multidisciplinary organization of care are not innate; it requires a 
specific organization and structure. (Interview with a CLCC  surgeon, 
2002; author's translation) 
 
The second reason for the success is related to the management of this 
project, which was not intended to have a top-down organization. On one 
hand, the whole medical community was invited to get involved. It was not 
limited to opinion leaders. Furthermore, each guideline had to be validated 
by every CLCC medical committee (composed of all physicians who worked 
inside the centre) before it could be published. On the other hand, reform- 
ers presented this project to the physicians as a way to improve their prac- 
tices rather than as a coercive means to control them. Medical evaluations 
were intended to assess the conformity of medical practices with the SORs, 
but no sanction was considered. 
The third reason is that physicians believed that the SORs helped them 
in their daily practices. On one hand, their involvement in the development 
and dissemination process contributed to their hyper-specialization (and 
authority) with certain cancers. Belonging to a national task force respon- 
sible for a SOR enhanced or consolidated a physician's reputation for treat- 
ing the corresponding cancer (similar to publishing the results of randomized 
clinical trials in leading medical journals). In the  same vein,  in  order  to 
adapt and implement the SORs, the management of a task force at  the 
regional level contributed to the regional authority  of this  physician:  not 
only could the physician make clear during discussions that he or she was 
well-versed in the literature and aware of the latest clinical trials, but at the 
same time the physician could also demonstrate to regional colleagues an 
inclination  to help them - thus exhibiting a kind  of altruism. 
 
[A medical leader] is someone who works a lot and who works well. We 
may evaluate this through his care for the patients we refer to him. But he 
is also someone who participates in task groups and in protocols. And he 
is someone who knows how to share his knowledge. The number of pub- 
lications is one criterion but it is not the only one. What counts more is 
showing one's intention of working ... and on the way one is trying to be 
acknowledged as a leader. There is also the human touch. (Interview with 
an oncologist in a general hospital, 2003; author's translation) 
 
Because of a significant increase in the number of papers related to ran- 
domized clinical trials in the early 1990s, it was difficult for  even CLCC 
physicians to be well informed on current treatments for  every  cancer. 
Given the fact that most of them specialized only in certain kinds  of can- 
cers, they tended to use the SORs as a resource for novel scientific infor- 
mation  about the cancers with which they were less familiar. 
  
 
 
I am an oncologist, but I do not know 10% of ail the decisions to take in 
oncology. We are hyper-specialized. For instance, I am specialized in 
prostate cancer. But when it departs from your hyper-specialization, it 
becomes very complicated. Guidelines will be referred to by physicians 
when the case departs from their specialty. (Interview with a radiothera- 
pist, 2000; author's translation) 
 
In particular, cancer centre physicians were interested in using the SORs for 
external counselling. When they had to give advice to peers on cancers in 
which they were not specialized, the SORs constituted a precious resource. 
 
Opportunistic Uses of Guidelines 
 
Other physicians might also perceive the strategic advantage of partici- 
pating in the regional process of implementing guidelines. Organ special- 
ists who wanted to specialize further in oncology, or oncologists who 
worked in public or private general hospitals and who therefore had to be 
trusted by surgeons, might choose to participate in the regional imple- 
mentation process in order to acquire local credibility - to convince col- 
leagues who might refer patients to them that they were competent to 
prescribe the correct treatments. There is no available study that com- 
pares overall survival rates among different hospitals in France. A doctor's 
reputation therefore rests on other (social) mechanisms, such as partici- 
pation in clinical research, which can allow a physician to acquire a 
distinctive reputation through publication or other communications. 
Participation in oncology networks in France - which develop guidelines 
and promote the creation of multidisciplinary (and sometimes multi-hospital) 
medical staff for making therapeutic decisions - can be viewed as another 
medical strategy for restoring medical authority. Physicians who were 
interviewed said they participated in that process in order to increase 
their knowledge, to appear competent when talking with their peers and 
to acquire a good reputation. 
Participating in a regional task force for implementing the SORs 
enabled physicians who worked in general healthcare organizations to have 
privileged and persona! access to the knowledge and experience of their aca- 
demic7 counterparts. Guidelines facilitated the sharing of specialized knowl- 
edge, so that 'rank-and-file' physicians depended less on the persona! advice 
of their illustrious colleagues about the most frequent types of cancers. We 
may then take Segrestin's (1996) analysis of the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) norms as applicable to guidelines as well: the 
'logic' of both kinds of tools consists of sharing knowledge which previously 
had been mastered only by experts. 
 
If someone wants to practice traditional surgery, [the work on guidelines] is 
not that important. But if someone wants to specialize in oncology, then .... 
It is changing so fast! Nobody is able to attend all scientific meetings; nobody 
is able to read the whole published literature. ... Ifsomeone wants to 'hyper- 
specialize', he has to know up-to-date treatments and nobody can do it on 
their own. (Interview with a private surgeon, 2003; author's translation) 
   
 
Such participation was a resource for physicians in their efforts to gain 
greater control over the management of patient 'trajectories' in both of 
Strauss' senses of the course of illness and the temporal organization of 
medical work (Strauss et al., 1985). This allowed them to intervene more 
intensively in the work of their colleagues. 
First, they could acquire greater legitimacy than other physicians. Sorne 
found the 'network' label useful for convincing their patients and peers (gen- 
eral practitioners, surgeons and diagnostic physicians, among others) that 
they were as competent as, say, physicians with academic training in the sub- 
ject. Such authority relied, then, more on local, collective norms than on 
individual competence. By contrast, organ specialists (gastroenterologists, 
surgeons, and so on), for whom tending to cancer patients did not represent 
a major part of their activity, did not get involved in networks. 
 
The network is useful to attest my competencies. 1 decided to adhere to it 
as soon as it began . ... Surgeons, when they send me a patient, know that 
some regional standards exist. Thus, 1 am writing in the medical record: 
'standard of [the regional network]'. It legitimizes my decision. They know 
that every patient is treated in the same way. (Interview with a medical 
oncologist, 2003; author's translation) 
 
Second, during task group discussions, they had the opportunity to break 
the monopoly over cancer care held by the academic physicians. The first 
social mechanism was negotiation, as Timmermans and Berg (2003) have 
shown: the organ specialists negotiated with academic physicians so that 
guidelines did not prescribe treatments that were  too complex and that 
could not be implemented  by general facilities (clinical trials, intensive 
chemotherapies, up-to-date diagnostic examinations, and so on). The sec- 
ond mechanism was trust: during discussions, the organ specialists got a 
chance to convince their (specialized) colleagues that they were competent 
and might even have some expertise. For example, some academic physi- 
cians who were interviewed said that before this process they tended to 
mistrust their colleagues who worked in general healthcare organizations, 
believing that they were insufficiently competent. However, after the dis- 
cussions, they said they were more inclined to allow such physicians to take 
care of patients who suffered 'standard' cancers (such as colon cancer or 
breast cancer) or even to re-assign such patients to them. 
 
This allowed me to meet some physicians who worked in general hospitals 
and whom 1had not known before. It helped me to avoid certain preju- 
dices. In the medical world, it is terrible how fast we label people! 'The pri- 
vate sector does not think anything but money!' 'The public sector does not 
do anything at ail!' But, when we came to know each other, we realized that 
people share a common interest: the patient! And we also realized that 
everybody worked hard. (Interview with an academic Jung specialist, 
responsible for a regional task group, 2003; author's translation) 
 
Last but not least, the guidelines constituted a robust argument for physicians, 
so that they could try to change the behavior of their peers and influence the 
  
 
 
management of patients. For instance, during multidisciplinary staff meetings, 
physicians were able to argue that a therapeutic decision was not 'evidence- 
based' and thus try to change it, even if the patient was not under their care. 
Physicians who wanted to propose a 'non-conforming' treatment had to jus- 
tify it. Another example lies in the changing relationships between surgeons 
and radiotherapists in an area in which treatment protocols had become 
broad. Surgeons grumbled about the growing encroachment of radiothera- 
pists on their autonomy. Radiotherapists dared to ask them to perform new 
operations when surgical margins were insufficient to meet the guidelines they 
had available. Another recurrent example had to do with relationships between 
diagnostic specialists and clinicians: the latter were more prone to use guide- 
lines to frame their colleagues' activities in terms of the timeliness and quality 
of their examination reports. 
 
[The regional protocols] make clear that 1am not manie or obsessive when 
1am asking them for some quality criteria: these criteria are written in the 
guidelines! For example, 1must have exam results in pathology or in radi- 
ology fifteen days later. As for pathologists, when we ask them to write some 
details, it is not because we are maniacs, it is only because it has to be that 
way. (Interview with a private surgeon, 2003; author's translation) 
 
Of course, this does not mean that physicians were compelled to obey their 
colleagues if they relied on guidelines. Other types of authority still existed 
in the sector. For example, when adapting a protocol, physicians could 
invoke the uniqueness of every therapeutic relationship. Academic physi- 
cians could rely on charisma or persona! prestige, and some of them even 
refused to participate in networks that implemented guidelines. They pre- 
ferred to organize frequent meetings in which they gave persona! advice on 
specific cases that were brought by non-specialized physicians. Nonetheless, 
our observations made clear  that rational-legal authority (Weber, 1968 
[1922]: 215-23) is becoming dominant in the French oncology sector. 
More physicians find it increasingly legitimate to justify therapeutic deci- 
sions and advice by reference to the guidelines and medical literature. 
Furthermore, guidelines facilitate an increasing 'lateral control regime' 
(Lazega, 2000) among physicians. In  contrast to the previous situation 
when physicians had limited opportunities to meet with and evaluate one 
anothers' work (Freidson & Rhea, 1963, 1965), guidelines represent a 
device that increases interdependency among physicians and acts as a 
frame of reference with which to judge colleagues. This analysis thus seems 
compatible with the results of some medical, quantitative studies on the 
impact of cancer guidelines on medical practices. While some national 
reports by the French Health Insurance complained about a global, low 
compliance rate of practices with national cancer guidelines, and especially 
with the SORs (Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Maladie  des Travailleurs 
Salari, 2003, 2005), a set of medical audits conducted in two  regions 
argued that a local implementation strategy might increase the degree of 
compliance with guidelines (Ray-Coquard et al., 2002, 2005). I hypothesize 
that this greater compliance is due to an increase in the local interdependency 
  
 
 
and mutual control that the implementation process provoked among the 
involved practitioners. 
 
Conclusion 
Medical standardization not only alters relational dynamics between physi- 
cians and non-physicians (patients, hospital managers and regulatory bodies), 
but it may also alter relationships among physicians themselves. In line with 
the reports of Timmermans and Berg (2003) and Cambrosio et al. (2006), 
this case study shows that standardization improves relationships  among 
physicians (for instance, through task groups) and influences the develop- 
ment of shared conventions that facilitate such interpersonal exchanges. 
Standardization in the medical field allows for an improvement in relation- 
ships between actors through mechanisms of collective learning, much as 
in the industrial sector (Segrestin, 1997; Cochoy et al., 1998; Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2000). 
This study of standardization in French oncology has also shown the 
value of taking political considerations into account when studying the 
development of standardized guidelines. Timmermans and Berg (2003: 21) 
also proposed 'a study of the politics of standardization in practice', but 
they did not define power, nor did they study the concrete processes of 
negotiation through which some physicians try to use standards to fos- 
ter collaboration with others for their own benefit. Here, I considered an 
interactive and strategic concept of power, which is a basic ingredient of 
exchange relations between actors placed in a context of strategic inter- 
dependence (Crozier, 1965; Boudon & Bourricaud, 1982; Chazel, 
1992). Power in this conception is the unequal and negotiated exchange 
of capacities for action through which every member tries simultane- 
ously to constrain other members of an organization, in order to satisfy 
expectations and avoid being constrained by the others (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1980; Friedberg, 1997). Strategy and resources are, there- 
fore, two key ideas related to this concept of power. In the case of French 
oncology, I established that standards were used as strategic resources by 
professional    actors    at     the     expense     of     others     in     order 
to improve their position or 'jurisdiction' (Abbott, 1988). The aims of 
such strategies were: (1) maintaining a sufficient volume of activity; and 
(2) increasing control over therapeutic decisions. CLCCs and oncolo- 
gists benefited the most from these standards. This may be explained by 
the fact that they had more resources at their disposai to develop guide- 
lines (in particular, their orientation toward clinical research and their 
traditional, multidisciplinary organization). However, as I also  men- 
tioned, some organ specialists were also able to use guidelines. 
According to this theoretical perspective on power, even actors placed in 
a favourable situation could not eliminate the capacity of other actors to 
resist. This explains why negotiations took place at every level of analy- 
sis: national, regional and local. By placing concrete exchange and bar- 
gaining relations at the core of the analysis, and showing how social 
  
 
 
control is continually challenged and (re)produced, the study demonstrated 
that standardization is not necessarily incompatible with local specifici- 
ties and variations,  and may even enhance them  (see also Timmermans 
& Berg, 1997; Zuiderent-Jerak, 2007). 
 
Notes 
I would like to thank Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating, Thomas Schlich and George Weisz 
for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at their conference, 'The 
Institutions of Objectivity in Medicine: Informai and Formai Modalities of Regulation', at 
McGill University (Montreal), 19-22 April 2007. I also thank Charles Rosenberg for his 
useful comments on that occasion, and Michael Lynch and the anonymous reviewers whose 
comments and suggestions helped me to clarify my arguments. I thank Erhard Friedberg for 
his helpful advice during this research, and Connie Chow and Martha Zuber for their  
editing assistance. 
1. While there is much to say about the ambiguity of guidelines for patients and their 
representatives (for a synthesis of these issues, see Berg [1997] and Timmermans & 
Kolker [2004]), the issue falls beyond the scope of this paper. Whereas some 
proponents of evidence-based medicine argue that guidelines may improve the 
appropriateness of healthcare practice, other actors fear that they may hinder the 
consideration of therapeutic alternatives that would be more appropriate to the specific 
needs of the individual patient. Sociologists diverge in their opinions as to whether 
protocols reinforce or weaken professional authority. 
2. The alliance between cancer centres and the League Against Cancer has historical 
and institutional roots, as both were created at the same time and by the same actors 
(see Pinell, 2002). At the local level, CLCC directors are frequently also presidents of 
the professional  associations for their specialities. In 1997 at the national level, the 
former president of the Federation became president  of his speciality association, but 
this alliance was also due to congruence between the strategic development 
programme of the association and the reform programme  of cancer centres (Castel & 
Friedberg,  2004). 
3. These guidelines are called 'Standards, Options and Recommendations'  (SOR) since 
they are classified into three categories. A clinical stance is called a 'Standard' when 
there is unanimity concerning its benefits, its inappropriateness or its potential danger. 
An 'Option' is so-called when a majority of physicians agrees with the benefits, 
inappropriateness or dangers of a specific stance. 'Recommendations' represents a 
choice by experts from different options. Each category is explicated by a degree of 
evidence, depending on the available scientific data. 
4. Since mid 2008, the situation has changed: the French National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
is now the administrator of the SOR project. However, as the website mentions 
(<www.sor-cancer.fr/>), the SORs were created by the FNCLCC, which still maintains 
a decisive role in the project since it is one of the three members of the leading 
consortium, together with the French NCI and the National League Against Cancer. 
5. In the same vein, Berg and colleagues (2000) showed that guidelines had been tools for 
insurance physicians in the Netherlands - used to restore the legitimacy of their 
practices, which had been criticized by non-physicians. 
6. To mention two characteristics: (1) oncology is a domain that from its beginning was 
'science rich' (Pinell, 2002) and was especially closely linked with the development of 
clinical research (Cambrosio, 2005; Keating & Cambrosio, 2007; Pickstone, 2007) so 
that oncologists were probably more apt to accept 'a shift from pathophysiology to 
epidemiology with guidelines' (Timmermans & Kolker, 2004: 177); (2) the increasing 
number of clinical trials for cancer remedies legitimates the need for tools to synthesize 
the evolution of medical knowledge. 
7. By 'academic physicians', I mean doctors working in hospitals whose missions are 
research and teaching, such as teaching hospital and cancer centre physicians. 
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